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Abstract 
We explore the impact of limited attention by analyzing the performance of hedge fund managers who are 
distracted by marital events. We find that marriages and divorces are associated with significantly lower 
fund alpha, during the six-month period surrounding and the two-year period after the event. Busy 
managers who manage multiple funds and who are not part of a team are more affected by marital 
transitions. Inattentive managers place fewer active bets relative to their style peers, load more on index 
stocks, exhibit higher R-squareds with respect to systematic factors, and are more prone to the disposition 
effect.  
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1. Introduction 
“Almost a quarter of British motorists admit that they have been so distracted by roadside 
billboards of semi-naked models that they have dangerously veered out of their lanes.”  
–Reuters (London), November 2005  
 
“One of my No. 1 rules as an investor is as soon as …  I find out that [a] manager is going 
through divorce, [I] redeem immediately.  Because the emotional distraction that comes from 
divorce is so overwhelming. … You can automatically subtract 10 to 20 percent from any 
manager if he is going through divorce.”  
–Paul Tudor Jones II, May 20131 
 
Due to limited attention, motorists are apparently unable to drive within their respective 
lanes while processing information contained in sexy billboards. Does limited attention also 
compromise investors’ ability to navigate financial markets? The academic literature has shown 
that limited investor attention impacts market prices and participants in the following ways. 
Limited attention shapes investor behavior, causing investors to underreact to earnings 
announcements (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009) and purchase high volume and high return 
stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008). Market participants suffering from limited attention neglect 
important economic links between supplier and consumer firms (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) and 
long-term demographic information (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007), thereby engendering stock 
																																								 																				
1 Jones founded and manages the Tudor Investment Corporation, which has $11.4 BN under management. Jones 
made the statement at a panel discussion at his alma mater, the University of Virginia. See “Hedge fund legend: if 
one of my managers is getting divorced, I'll pull my money out,” Business Insider, 23 May 2013 and “Tudor said to 
open first macro hedge fund in decade,” Bloomberg, 2 July 2012. 
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return predictability. Investor inattention drives firm behavior; firms are incentivized to release 
disappointing earnings news on Fridays so as to take advantage of under-reaction by distracted 
investors (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). Limited attention can explain category learning (Peng 
and Xiong, 2006), style investing (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Teo and Woo, 2004) and 
comovement (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005), and has other asset pricing implications 
(Hendershott et al., 2013). Yet, there is little evidence to suggest that investor inattention directly 
compromises investment performance. This paper fills this void by analyzing the impact of 
limited attention on the investment performance of hedge fund managers.  
The hedge fund industry is an interesting laboratory for investigating the impact of limited 
attention as the complex and dynamic trading strategies that hedge fund managers employ, which 
may involve short sales, leverage, and derivatives, often impose extraordinary demands on their 
time.2 Consequently, hedge fund investors, such as Paul Tudor Jones II, highly value a fund 
manager’s ability to stay focused in the investment game. Yet, to raise capital and achieve critical 
mass, hedge fund managers are often side-tracked by capital raising activities such as speaking at 
hedge fund conferences, attending capital introduction events, and meeting individual investors. 
Moreover, as her business grows, a hedge fund manager may find it increasingly difficult to 
concentrate on her investment duties given the day-to-day demands associated with running a 
large asset management firm. Indeed, to sharpen their ability to focus in stressful market 
conditions, some prominent hedge fund managers such as Ray Dalio of Bridgewater Associates 
have taken to meditation.3  
																																								 																				
2	See “Red Bull-fueled all-nighters put Fortress fund on top,” Bloomberg, 17 July 2013.  
3 See “To make a killing on Wall Street, start meditating,” Bloomberg, 28 May 2014. According to Lazar et al., 
(2005), meditation experience is associated with increased cortical thickness, suggesting that meditation improves 
attention, sensory processing, and stress management.  
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Motivated by Jones’s claim, we examine the impact of marital events on hedge fund 
managers’ performance using 98 marriages and 76 divorces from publicly available, court-
reported data. We argue that marriage and divorce are deeply personal events that distract fund 
managers from their investment duties.4 In line with Jones’s statement, we find that money 
managers significantly underperform during a divorce. In the six-month period surrounding a 
divorce, hedge fund managers underperform by 4.33 percent per annum relative to the pre-
divorce period.5 After adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, 
the underperformance during the divorce increases to 7.79 percent per annum. The deleterious 
effects of a divorce extend beyond the six-month event window. Hedge funds continue to 
underperform by a risk-adjusted 2.29 percent per annum up to two years post divorce. The 
distraction induced by a marriage has a similar effect on investment performance. In the six-
month period surrounding a marriage, hedge fund managers underperform by an annualized 3.13 
percent relative to the 21-month period before the event window. After adjusting for co-variation 
with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the underperformance during a marriage worsens 
to an annualized 5.10 percent. Moreover, for the two-year period post marriage, hedge funds 
continue to underperform by an annualized 3.16 percent after adjusting for risk. 
Our results are not driven by the usual factors that explain hedge fund returns. Even after 
controlling for a myriad of factors that explain fund performance including fund incentives 
(Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), share restrictions (Aragon, 2007), age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 
2010), and size (Berk and Green, 2004), we find that both divorce and marriage are associated 
																																								 																				
4 Paul Tudor Jones II, in clarifying remarks after the University of Virginia panel discussion, noted that “life events, 
such as birth, divorce, death of a loved one and other emotional highs and lows are obstacles to success in this 
specific field of finance (managing global macro hedge funds).” See “Investor Paul Tudor Jones says mothers can’t 
be top traders” ABC News, 24 May 2013. This suggests that, for hedge fund managers at least, a marriage may not 
be so helpful for investment performance. 
5 Inferences do not change when we experiment with shorter or longer event windows.  
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with significant deteriorations in investment performance. The findings are also not artifacts of 
the decline in hedge fund risk-adjusted performance over time (Fung and Hsieh, 2004). We 
match our sample of marital event funds with other hedge funds based on performance in the 
pre-event window. We find that relative to this matched fund sample, hedge fund alpha wanes by 
an annualized 10.03 percent during a marriage and 11.70 percent during a divorce. We also 
discuss several alternative explanations for our findings and show that these endogeneity stories 
are unlikely to drive the bulk of our results.  
Are marital events more impactful for busy managers who can ill afford the distractions 
associated with such events? To investigate, we stratify fund managers into high and low 
bandwidth groups based on the number of funds managed and on whether a fund manager is part 
of a team, and re-do our multivariate regression analysis. We find that marriages and divorces 
hurt the performance of managers who control at least two funds more than that of managers 
running only one fund. Similarly, marital transitions are associated with strong and statistically 
significant reductions in performance for funds with low bandwidth fund managers who do not 
belong to a team. Conversely, funds that are team-managed experience more modest and 
statistically unreliable reductions in performance during marital transitions. These results are 
broadly consistent with the limited attention view.  
We also explore the potential channels through which marital events engender 
deteriorations in investment performance. Consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, we 
find that fund managers trade less actively during marital transitions. They are more likely to 
herd with their investment style, load up more on index stocks, increase their R-squareds with 
respect to systematic factors, and reduce their Active Share vis-à-vis the S&P 500. In line with 
Titman and Tiu (2011), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Kacpercyzk, Sialm and Zheng (2005), 
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we find that such trading behavior is associated with poorer fund performance. In addition, we 
find that inattentive hedge fund managers are less disciplined, in the sense that they are more 
susceptible to the disposition effect. In the spirit of Odean (1998), we show that this behavior 
may hurt fund performance.  
Our work sheds light on how limited investor attention brought about by marital events 
can impact investment performance. By doing so, we contribute to academic debate on the value 
of active management in the hedge fund industry. Malkiel and Saha (2005) and Griffin and Xu 
(2009) report that hedge funds do not outperform their benchmarks on average. Getsmansky, Lo, 
and Makarov (2004) argue that whatever performance persistence found by Brown, Goetzmann, 
and Ibbotson (1999) and Agarwal and Naik (2000) can be ascribed to illiquidity-induced serial 
correlation in returns. Yet, more recent work, by explicitly accounting for luck (Kosowski, Naik, 
and Teo, 2007), re-examining performance persistence (Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov, 
2010), conditioning on macroeconomic variables (Avramov et al., 2011), and analyzing 
confidential holdings (Agarwal et al., 2013), has found evidence of skill. Our work allows us to 
weigh-in on the debate, since if performance is largely due to luck, it should not matter to fund 
performance whether a fund manager is distracted or not. The results suggest that just like 
motivated (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), and 
geographically proximate (Teo, 2009) fund managers, attentive fund managers also tend to 
outperform.  
The results also speak to the extant literature on marriage and productivity. The 
traditional Becker (1973) view in the marriage literature posits that marriage increases long-term 
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productivity via the division of labor.6 Consistent with this view, Korenman and Neumark (1991) 
show that married men make more than unmarried men. Cornaglia and Feldman (2011) and 
Bellas and Toutkoushian (1999) find that married baseball players and academics deliver higher 
batting averages and publish more research papers, respectively, than their unmarried 
counterparts. We complement this literature by showing, at least in the context of investment 
management, that marriage can be disruptive to short-term productivity because the event 
distracts fund managers from their investment activities.7  
This study echoes related work in corporate finance that assesses the impact of CEO 
vacation travel (Yermack, 2014), family deaths (Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon, 
2010), and hospitalizations (Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon, 2012) on firm 
outcomes. In particular, Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2010, 2012) find that 
when CEOs are sidetracked by deaths in their immediate families or by their own medical 
conditions, firm operating profitability, investment, and sales growth decline. Like Yermack 
(2014) and Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2010, 2012), we assess the impact of 
personal events on the professional lives of managers. Consistent with Bennedsen, Pérez-
González, and Wolfenzon (2010, 2012), we find that managers are a key determinant in firm 
profitability.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of 
the data and methodology. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis. Section 4 
presents robustness tests while Section 5 concludes. 
																																								 																				
6	For example, in a married household, one partner focuses on cooking, cleaning, and childcare. Unencumbered by 
such demands, the other partner focuses exclusively on work, thereby raising productivity.	
7 We note however that in the long-term marriage can still be helpful for productivity, as suggested by Becker 
(1973). Our results do not speak to the long-term effects of marriage. 
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2. Data and methodology 
We evaluate the impact of hedge funds using monthly net-of-fee returns and assets under 
management data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge data sets from January 1990 to December 2012.8 Because TASS, Morningstar, 
HFR, and BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994, the data sets do not contain 
information on funds that died before December 1993. This gives rise to survivorship bias. We 
mitigate this bias by focusing on data from January 1994 onward. 
 In our fund universe, we have a total of 31,542 hedge funds, of which 18,295 are live 
funds and 13,247 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share 
classes could cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.9 This 
leaves a total of 26,811 hedge funds, of which 15,550 are live funds and 11,261 are dead funds. 
The funds are roughly evenly split between TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and BarclayHedge. While 
5,805 funds appear in multiple databases, many funds belong to only one database. Specifically, 
there are 6,595, 5,317, 4,847 and 4,247 funds unique to the TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining data from more 
than one source. In addition to monthly return and size information, our sample also captures 
data on fund characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, redemption period, lock-
up period, investment style, leverage indicator, high-water mark indicator, fund age, and fund 
																																								 																				
8 The results are robust to using pre-fee returns. To derive pre-fee returns it is important to match each capital 
outflow to the relevant capital inflow when calculating the high water mark and the performance fee. In our pre-fee 
return calculation, we assume as per Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) that capital leaves the fund 
on a first-in, first-out basis. To side-step this issue, we prefer to work with the cleaner, reported net-of-fee returns in 
the paper.  
9 Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis. 
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location.10 
 We hand collect money managers’ marital records from several data sources. The 
primary data source is Lexis-Nexis court record searches, and this is supplemented by Internet 
searches. For each money manager, we start by performing a name search in Lexis-Nexis using 
the first name, middle initials, and last name. If there are multiple matches with the same middle 
initials, we use other Internet public sources to identify possible spouses, and then locate the 
correct marriage/divorce records. The matches are also confirmed by cross checking the 
marriage location with the city and state of the manager’s management firm.  
We are able to obtain marriage and divorce records for the following 13 states: Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia, which publicly disclose marital records. The remaining states 
do not disclose marriage and divorce data publicly.11  The search results in 857 marriages and 
251 divorces for 786 hedge fund managers. Table 1 presents the distribution of marriages and 
divorces by state, as well as the divorce rates for each state.12 The overall divorce to marriage 
ratio is lower than that of the general American public (2 marriages for each divorce) but this is 
consistent with the lower divorce rate that Isen and Stevenson (2010) document for more highly 
educated segments of the public. One caveat is that many of the hedge fund managers married 
																																								 																				
10	For funds in multiple databases, we follow a priority rule and only keep the observations from the highest priority 
database.	We adopt the following priority rule for our fund data: TASS > Morningstar > HFR > BarclayHedge. We 
are motivated by the observation in Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2014) that TASS was the most widely used 
database by hedge fund researchers. They base their observation on 76 papers published in five frequently cited 
finance journals. We re-do our baseline multivariate regression results using three alternative priority rules: (i) 
Morningstar > HFR > BarclayHedge > TASS, (ii) HFR > BarclayHedge > TASS > Morningstar, and (iii) 
BarclayHedge > TASS > Morningstar > HFR, and find virtually identical results.  
11 For example, New York State restricts access to marriage records to “the spouses [and] other persons who have a: 
(1) documented judicial or other proper purpose or (2) New York State Court Order.” (see 
http://www.health.ny.gov/vital_records/marriage.htm) 
12	It is possible for a marriage in one state to be dissolved in another, leading to observations such as two divorces 
and zero marriages for the state of Arizona.  
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and divorced prior to the start of our sample period, i.e., before 1994. Therefore the effective 
sample for the event study is smaller. Moreover, we require that a hedge fund manager reports 
returns during the one-year period before and the one-year period after the event. This allows us 
to conduct matched sample analyses where we match funds based on performance in the pre-
event window. After applying this inclusion criterion, we are left with an effective sample of 98 
marriages and 76 divorces on which to conduct our event study.13 
Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, 
respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity 
markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportunities 
created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, 
bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet 
on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the futures 
and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices of 
financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. 
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh, 2000; 2009). These 
biases stem from the fact that, due to the lack of regulation of hedge funds, inclusion in hedge 
fund databases is voluntary. As a result, there is a self-selection bias. For instance, funds often 
undergo an incubation period in which they rely on internal funding before seeking capital from 
outside investors. Incubated funds with successful track records then go on to list in various 
																																								 																				
13 The limited number of marital events during our sample period biases against us finding statistical significance 
when we run our empirical tests. 
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hedge fund databases while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias.  
Separate from this, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing 
date. Again, because successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, 
these backfilled returns tend to be higher than the non backfilled returns. In the analysis that 
follows, we will repeat the baseline tests after dropping the first 12 months of return data from 
each fund so as to ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias. 
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the 
difference between the Wilshire small and large capitalization stock indices; the yield spread of 
the US ten-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of the 
ten-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the ten-
year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY); and the excess returns 
on portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), 
and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum possible return from 
trend following strategies (see Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets.14 
These seven factors have been shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable 
explanatory power on hedge fund returns.  
 
 
																																								 																				
14  David Hsieh kindly supplied these risk factors. The trend following factors can be downloaded from 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-Fac.xls. 
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3. Empirical results 
3.1. Cross-sectional analysis 
As a prelude to exploring the impact of marital events on hedge fund performance, we 
stratify hedge funds into four groups by fund manager marital status at the end of the sample. 
The four groups include (1) single managers who have never been married, i.e., those with no 
marriage records (2) married managers who have never been divorced, i.e., those with a single 
marriage record and no divorce records (3) divorced managers who married once, i.e., those with 
a single marriage record and a single divorce record (4) managers who have been married 
multiple times, i.e., those with multiple marriage records. Next, we evaluate differences in fund 
characteristics, returns, alpha, flows, total risk, and idiosyncratic risk between these groups of 
managers, where total risk is the standard deviation of monthly fund returns while idiosyncratic 
risk is the standard deviation of the monthly residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model. Factor loadings are estimated using a 24-month rolling window.  
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that single managers who have never been 
married tend to take on greater total risk and idiosyncratic risk than all other managers. For 
example relative to managers who have been married multiple times, single managers deliver 
raw returns that are 31.0 basis points more volatile and abnormal returns that are 28.3 basis 
points more volatile per month. These results are broadly consistent with Love (2010) and 
Roussanov and Savor (2014) who find that single men tend to take on more risk than unmarried 
men. The view is that single fund managers take on greater risk so as to increase their status in 
the marriage market. However, the differences are either marginally statistically significant (i.e., 
significant at the ten percent level) in the case of total risk or unreliably different from zero in the 
 
	
12 
case of idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, it is hard to make inferences from these cross-sectional 
results.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
While there are no discernible differences in returns and alphas across the four groups of 
fund managers, the differences in fund characteristics and flows reported in Table 2 yield some 
interesting insights. We find that single fund managers who have never been married tend to 
manage funds with shorter lock-ups and greater inflows than fund managers who have had 
multiple marriages. One view is that single fund managers, to accumulate wealth and raise their 
status in the marriage market, are highly focused on raising capital. To attract capital, these 
managers offer less onerous redemption terms to their investors. Another view is that managers 
with multiple marriages tend to be distracted by their obligations to their ex-partners and children 
from previous marriages, and are less focused on growing the fund management company. 
3.2. Event study 
In this section, we explore the impact of marriage and divorce on the investment 
performance of hedge fund managers. At the same time we also examine the effects of such 
marital events on manager risk-taking and capital raising behavior. In that effort, we define the 
event period as the six-month period surrounding a marriage or a divorce.15 The “before” period 
is the period that starts two years before the marital event and ends just before the event window. 
The “after” period is the period that starts just after the event window and ends two years after 
the event. Therefore, the before and after windows each spans 21 months. Our choice of the 
event window is guided by our view that the activities associated with a marriage (e.g., wedding 
																																								 																				
15	To clarify, if a fund manager gets married in May, the event period runs from February to July of the same year.  
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preparations, honeymoon, purchase of a matrimonial home, and childbirth) and divorce (e.g., 
legal proceedings to determine alimony, custody of children, and division of matrimonial assets) 
are likely to take place over a period of time.16 
Next, we evaluate differences in returns, alphas, flows, total risk, and idiosyncratic risk 
between the aforementioned periods in event time. The univariate performance results reported 
in Table 3 are broadly in line with the view expounded by Paul Tudor Jones II. Relative to the 
period before a marriage, marriage reduces returns by 3.13 percent per annum and lowers alpha 
by 5.10 percent per annum. The underperformance is not confined to the event window. After 
adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors, fund managers continue 
to underperform by an annualized 3.16 percent up to two years after the marriage. The impact of 
divorce is comparable to that of marriage. Relative to the period before a divorce, divorce 
precipitates a 4.33 percent per annum reduction in returns and a 7.79 percent per annum drop in 
alpha. Risk-adjusted returns recover by 5.50 percent per annum post event. Still two years after 
the divorce, post-event window alphas continue to lag pre-event window alphas by an annualized 
2.29 percent.17  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The comparison of risk-taking behavior before and after a marriage yields results that 
echo those from the prior literature and corroborate the findings from Table 2 on risk-taking. We 
find that in the period after a marriage, total risk decreases by an annualized 1.34 percent and 
																																								 																				
16 Our baseline inferences do not change when we specify a longer 12-month event period and correspondingly 
shorter 18-month before and after periods or when we employ a shorter 1-month event period and correspondingly 
longer 23-month before and after periods. 
17	While our sample consists of predominantly male fund managers, we note that there are two female managers 
who tied the knot during our sample period. For these two female managers, the average impact of marriage on fund 
performance is consistent with that for the entire sample. In particular, their average annualized fund alpha drops 
from 9.72 percent in the pre-event period to 6.12 percent in the event period, and subsequently to -5.52 percent in 
the post-event period.  
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idiosyncratic risk shrinks by an annualized 1.85 percent relative to the period before a marriage. 
The former is significant at the ten percent level, while the latter is statistically significant at the 
one percent level.  This suggests that fund managers tend to take on less risk after marriage. 
However, we do not witness an opposite effect post divorce. Contrary to the predictions of the 
Love (2010) model, risk taking does not increase after a divorce. The point estimates in Table 3 
indicate that risk taking by hedge fund managers actually decreases following a divorce, 
although the effects are not reliably different from zero. We note also that flows tend to peak 
during the marital event and decline after the event, perhaps in reaction to the decline in 
performance.   
One concern is that our findings may be driven by other factors known to explain hedge 
fund returns. For example, single managers may be highly motivated to raise capital so as to 
increase their status in the marriage market. Post marriage, these managers will have to grapple 
with the increased assets under management and the resultant diseconomies of scale, which may 
make it difficult for the manager to outperform. To address such concerns, we estimate the 
following multivariate regression on fund performance for both marriage and divorce events: 
!"#$!!" = ∝ +!!!"!#$!" + !!!"#$%!" + !!!"#$%%! + !!!"#$$""! + !!!"#!+ !!!"#$%&! + !!!"#"$%&"! + !!!"#!"!! + !!!"#"$%&'()!+ !!" log !"#$%&'(!"!! + !!" 
where !"#$!!" is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor alpha for fund i and month m with factor 
loadings estimated over the last 24 months, EVENT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one in the six-month period starting three months prior to the marital event and ending three 
months after the marital event, and a value of zero otherwise, AFTER is an indicator variable that 
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takes a value of one in the 21-month period starting three months after the marital event and 
ending two years after the event, and a value of zero otherwise, MGTFEE is fund management 
fee, PERFFEE is fund performance fee, HWM is fund high-water mark indicator, LOCKUP is 
fund lock-up period, LEVERAGE is fund leverage indicator, AGE is fund age since inception, 
REDEMPTION is fund redemption period, and log(FUNDSIZE) is the natural logarithm of fund 
assets under management. We also estimate regressions on fund returns and fund total risk.18  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates from the multivariate regressions. The 
coefficient estimates on EVENT and AFTER dummies in the marriage regressions indicate that 
after controlling for other variables that explain fund performance, marriage reduces hedge fund 
alpha by an annualized 7.30 percent over the event window and by an annualized 3.42 percent up 
to two years after the event. Similarly, the coefficient estimates on the EVENT and AFTER 
dummies in the divorce regressions reveal that divorce precipitates a 5.66 percent drop in 
annualized hedge fund alpha over the event window and a 3.29 percent drop in annualized hedge 
fund alpha up to two years after the event. The coefficient estimates on the control variables 
dovetail broadly with prior research. Consistent with Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), returns and 
alpha are negatively correlated with fund age. Also, in the spirit of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 
(2009), high performance fee funds outperform low performance fee funds. In response to 
concerns about backfill and incubation bias, we re-estimate the regressions after removing the 
																																								 																				
18 Fund total risk is the standard deviation of monthly fund returns estimated over each non-overlapping period: 
before, event, and after. Hence for each marital event, the number of observations for the risk regression is 
significantly lower than those for the return and alpha regressions. 
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first 12 months of returns after inception for each fund. Our findings are robust to this 
adjustment.19  
The regressions in Table 4 are estimated only for the event funds during the 48-month 
period surrounding the marital event. The benefit of doing so is that the coefficient estimates on 
the control variables will be estimated specifically for the event funds. This specification caters 
for the possibility that the event funds are more susceptible to say capacity constraints than the 
rest of the fund population. The downside is that the regression coefficients are estimated with 
lower precision. As a robustness check, we also estimate the Table 4 regressions on the full 
sample of funds and find qualitatively similar results. Marriage and divorce still engender 
significant deteriorations in performance under that regression specification. 
 While the multivariate regression results reported in Table 4 control for a host of 
variables that explain fund performance, there may be concerns that we have not adequately 
accounted for possible time trends in hedge fund performance. For example, Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) provide evidence that the average hedge fund alpha has diminished over time. The 
reduction in alpha over time may explain why we find that hedge fund risk-adjusted performance 
wanes post marriage and post divorce. Moreover, such a time trend in performance may be 
driven by industry or macroeconomic factors that are tangential to the fund level control 
variables employed in the Table 4 regressions. To allay concerns that a time trend in fund 
performance is driving our results, we employ a “difference-in-differences” methodology and 
																																								 																				
19 Our results are robust to including past one-year fund performance (returns or alpha) as an additional independent 
variable in the regressions.  
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match each fund with a marital event with another fund based on fund performance in the before 
period.20 Next, we estimate the following multivariate regression: 
!"#$!!" = ∝ +!!!"!#$!" + !!!"#$%!" + !!!"#$!%#&!!" ∗ !"#$%"!"+ !!!"#$!%#&!!" ∗ !"!#$!" + !!!"#$!%#&!!" ∗ !"#$%!"+ !!!"#$%%! + !!!"#$$""! + !!!"#! + !!!"#$%&! + !!"!"#"$%&"!+ !!!!"#!"!! + !!"!"#"$%&'()! + !!"log (!"#$%&'(!"!!)+ !!" 
where TREATMENT is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the fund manager 
experiences a marital event, i.e., the fund is in the treatment group, and takes a value of zero if 
the fund is in the control group. BEFORE is an indicator variable that takes a value of one in the 
21-month period starting two years prior to the marital event and ending three months before the 
marital event, and a value of zero otherwise. The rest of the variables are as previously defined. 
Note that BEFORE, EVENT, and AFTER variables are defined for each matched fund based on 
the date of the marital event for the original fund that the matched fund is linked to. We also 
estimate the analogous regression on returns to check that our results are not driven by our risk 
adjustment methodology. The standard errors in the regressions are clustered by fund in line with 
Petersen (2009) and Rogers (1993) so as to account for the firm effect, which could be present in 
hedge fund data given that hedge fund returns are often serially correlated.21 
																																								 																				
20 Funds are matched based on returns for the return regressions and based on alpha for the alpha regressions. For 
each event fund, a matched fund is chosen to minimize the difference in performance during the before period. To 
be considered as a matched fund, we require that a non-event fund reports returns during the period starting 12 
months prior to the event to 12 months after the event. 
21 The results are weaker but qualitatively similar when we cluster by fund and year or when we employ fund and 
year dummies in the regressions. Specifically, when we cluster by both fund and year, the coefficient estimates on 
EVENT and AFTER are all negative and statistically significant at the five percent level in the alpha regressions, 
except for that on AFTER in the marriage regression, which is statistically different from zero at the ten percent 
level. When we employ fund and year dummies, the coefficient estimates on EVENT and AFTER are again negative 
and statistically significant at the five percent level, save for that on AFTER in the marriage regression, which is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero at the ten percent level.  
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 The coefficient estimates from the regression on the matched sample are reported in 
Table 5. They indicate that even after accounting for the performance of the matched funds in 
our control group, hedge fund alpha for the funds in our treatment group still wanes post 
marriage and post divorce. Relative to the period before a marriage and relative to the funds in 
the control group, annualized hedge fund alpha declines by 10.03 percent during the marriage 
event window and by 3.92 percent in the post-event window period. Likewise, compared to the 
period before a divorce and compared to the funds in the control group, annualized hedge fund 
alpha wanes by 11.70 percent during the divorce event window and by 7.78 percent in the post 
event window period. These results provide strong evidence that the distractions associated with 
marital events are detrimental to professional portfolio management.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
3.3. Fund manager bandwidth 
To further understand the underlying reasons why hedge fund performance suffers when 
fund managers marry or divorce, we stratify our sample based on fund manager bandwidth. We 
hypothesize that marital events have a greater impact on managers who have lower bandwidth 
and can therefore ill afford the distractions associated with marital transitions. We take 
advantage of the fact that the hedge fund manager to fund mapping is not always one to one. 
Hedge fund managers often manage more than one fund within a hedge fund firm. In addition, 
some funds are team-managed while other funds are not. We classify fund managers managing 
multiple funds or managers who are not part of a team as low bandwidth managers and fund 
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managers managing one fund or fund managers who are part of a team as high bandwidth 
managers.22 
In Table 6, we report the multivariate regression results after sorting managers by the 
number of funds that they manage and after sorting funds by the number of managers. We find 
that consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, the impact of both marriage and divorce are 
confined to instances where fund manager bandwidth is low, i.e., when a manager runs two or 
more funds or when a fund is not managed by a team. For example, during a marriage, managers 
simultaneously managing two or more funds suffer a statistically significant 15.34 percent 
reduction in annualized risk-adjusted performance, while those running only one fund witness a 
modest and statistically unreliable 4.60 percent drop in annualized performance. During a 
divorce, managers running two or more funds experience a statistically significant reduction in 
annualized alpha of 10.88 percent while managers controlling only one fund experience an 
increase in annualized alpha of 4.14 percent that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Similarly, the impact of marital transitions on fund alpha for fund managers who are not part of a 
team is about two to three times as large as that for fund managers who operate in a team. 
Moreover, the coefficient estimates on the EVENT and AFTER variables for the former fund 
managers are statistically significant at the five percent level while those for the latter are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results are consistent with the view expounded by 
Jones that life events distract professional money managers from their investment activities. 
																																								 																				
22	Of the 98 marriages that we analyze, 32 are associated with managers managing one fund while 66 are associated 
with managers managing multiple funds. In addition, 43 are linked to single manager funds while 55 are linked to 
team managed funds. Of the 76 divorces that we analyze, 35 are associated with managers running one fund while 
41 are associated with managers running multiple funds. Moreover, 30 are connected to funds managed by a single 
manager while 46 are connected to funds managed by teams.  
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They indicate that marital events are most detrimental to busy managers who can least afford 
such distractions in their professional lives.     
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
3.4. Style-, index-, and factor-hugging activity  
How do marital events and the distractions that come with those events engender 
deteriorations in investment performance for hedge fund managers? One view is that time 
constrained fund managers may simply place fewer active bets relative to their peers or load up 
more on index stocks. Kacpercyzk, Sialm and Zheng (2005), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and 
Titman and Tiu (2011) suggest that such behavior is likely to be detrimental to fund alpha. 
Another view is that distracted fund managers become less disciplined and more susceptible to 
behavioral biases such as the disposition effect. Odean (1998) shows that the disposition effect, 
or the propensity to hold on to one’s losses and realize one’s gains, can hurt investment 
performance as disposition-inclined investors sell winner stocks (gains) which subsequently 
appreciate in price and hold on to loser stocks (losses) which subsequently depreciate in price.  
To investigate, we construct four trading behavior metrics to measure how active a fund 
manager is: DEVIATESTYLE, NONSPRATIO, NRSQUARED, and ACTIVESHARE. The metric 
DEVIATESTYLE is the absolute difference in fund factor loadings relative to those of its 
investment style, summed over the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Investment style 
returns are the equal-weighted average of all funds in an investment style. A higher 
DEVIATESTYLE score indicates that a fund places more active bets relative to its investment 
style peers. NONSPRATIO, derived from quarterly stock holdings, is the ratio of the number of 
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non S&P 500 index stocks bought in a quarter to the total number of new positions in the quarter. 
A higher NONSPRATIO score indicates that a fund is loading up less on S&P 500 index stocks. 
NRSQUARED is the one minus the R-squared from the regression of fund excess returns against 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. ACTIVESHARE is Active Share as defined in Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009) relative to the S&P 500. The trading behavior metrics are defined such that 
an increase in any of them represents a more active portfolio. We compute DEVIATESTYLE, 
NONSPRATIO, NRSQUARED, and ACTIVESHARE for the before, event, and after periods.  
The findings, reported in Panels A and B of Table 7, indicate that style-, index-, and 
factor-hugging activity increases during marital transitions. Relative to the before period, 
DEVIATESTYLE decreases by 29 percent and 38 percent in the after period following a marriage 
and a divorce, respectively. Similarly, relative to the before period, NONSPRATIO decreases by 
11 percent and 10 percent in the after period following a marriage and a divorce, respectively. 
Likewise, relative to the before period, NRSQUARED decreases by 12 percentage points and 10 
percentage points in the after period following a marriage and a divorce, respectively. Finally, 
relative to the before period, ACTIVESHARE falls by 2.4 percentage points and 2.1 percentage 
points in the after period following a marriage and a divorce, respectively. The decrease in 
DEVIATESTYLE, NRSQUARED, and ACTIVESHARE are statistically different from zero at the 
five percent or one percent level for both marriage and divorce while the decrease in 
NONSPRATIO is statistically different from zero at the one percent level for marriage.23 We also 
match our event funds with control funds based on the relevant trading behavior metric and 
perform a difference-in-differences analysis. The findings reported in Panels C and D of Table 7 
																																								 																				
23 Note that we do not find that hedge funds trade less during marital transitions. Turnover per se does not decrease 
during or post marriage or divorce. There is also little evidence to suggest that hedge fund managers deliberately 
time their marriages and divorces to coincide with periods of lower trading activity. For example, we do not find that 
the marriages or divorces cluster around the summer months. We note that, based on our sample, marriages are more 
likely in April, July, and November while divorces are more likely in June and September.     
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indicate that our results are not simply a by-product of industry-wide trends in trading behavior. 
In unreported results that are available upon request, we show that decreases in NONSPRATIO, 
NRSQUARED, and ACTIVESHARE are associated with statistically significant declines in fund 
alpha for our sample of marital event funds. These results are broadly consistent with those of 
Kacpercyzk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Titman and Tiu 
(2011). 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
3.5. Disposition effect  
To test the view that hedge fund managers are more susceptible to the disposition effect 
around marital events, we obtain stock holdings information from the Thomson Financial 13-F 
holdings database for the fund managers in our sample. Next, we evaluate the difference between 
the proportion of losses realized (PLR) and the proportion of gains realized (PGR) for the before, 
event, and after periods. Our analysis follows Odean (1998). We define PLR as the number of 
realized losses divided by the number of realized losses plus the number of paper (unrealized) 
losses, and PGR as the number of realized gains divided by the number of realized gains plus the 
number of paper (unrealized) gains. Realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses 
are aggregated over time for each period (i.e., before, event, and after) and over all funds. We 
compute t-statistics that test the null hypothesis that the differences in proportions are equal to 
zero assuming all realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses result from 
independent decisions. To calculate the t-statistics, the standard error for the difference in 
proportions PGR and PLR is: 
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!"#(1− !"#)!!" + !!" + !"#(1− !"#)!!" + !!"  
where !!", !!", !!", and !!" are the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and 
paper losses.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results from the disposition effect tests are reported in Table 8. They indicate that 
hedge fund managers are more prone to the disposition effect during a marriage and during a 
divorce. The difference between PLR and PGR is positive and statistically different from zero at 
the one percent level during the before period prior to a marriage, suggesting that hedge fund 
managers are not afflicted by the disposition effect during that time. Yet during the event period, 
we find that the difference between PLR and PGR is negative and statistically different from 
zero at the one percent level. This indicates that hedge fund managers are susceptible to the 
disposition effect during the marriage event. In particular, in the six-month period surrounding a 
marriage, they realize 51.1 percent of their gains but only 45.2 percent of their losses. However, 
the impact of marriage on the propensity of hedge fund managers to hold on to their losses and 
realize their gains does not extend beyond the marriage event period. We find that the difference 
between PLR and PGR is negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero during the post-
marriage after period. We note that the change in the difference between PLR and PGR is 
statistically significant at the one percent level when we go from the before period to the event 
period and when we go from the before period to the after period.  
Divorces, unlike marriages, appear to have a more durable impact on the hedge fund 
manager’s susceptibility to the disposition effect. We find that hedge fund managers are prone to 
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the disposition effect before, during, and after a divorce. Moreover, the propensity to hold on to 
losses and realize gains increases as we move from the period before a divorce to the period after 
a divorce. During the before period, hedge fund managers realize 33.8 percent of their gains and 
31.5 percent of their losses. The spread between PGR and PLR increases as we move to the 
event period, where hedge fund managers realize 41.5 percent of their gains but only 37.0 
percent of their losses. In the after period, the gap between PGR and PLR increases marginally 
from 4.5 percent to 4.6 percent.  The change in the difference between PLR and PGR is 
statistically different from zero at the ten percent level when we move from the before period to 
the event period and statistically different from zero at the five percent level when we move from 
the before period to the after period. These results indicate that the propensity to hold on to 
losses and realize gains increases during a divorce. They also suggest that the effect of a divorce 
on manager trading behavior is stronger and more durable than that of a marriage. The fact that 
PLR is less than PGR before a divorce but not before a marriage suggests also that unlike that of 
a marriage the impact of a divorce may manifest up to two years prior to the event itself. These 
results are not surprising, given that it may take a few years to finalize a divorce, especially when 
there are disagreements over child custody or the division of matrimonial assets, and the divorce 
is contested in court. In unreported results that are available upon request, we show that 
consistent with Odean (1998), increases in the propensity towards the disposition effect are 
associated with statistically significant declines in fund alpha for our sample of marital event 
funds.  
3.6. Alternative explanations 
An alternative explanation for our findings is that marriage and to a lesser extent divorce 
are life choices with an element of timing. Given this, it could be that fund returns are driving 
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these marital decisions, rather than the marital events affecting returns. This could manifest itself 
in a number of ways: 
First, marriage would likely by preceded by good returns and divorces by bad returns. 
Even if divorces have no effect on fund returns, performance persistence (Kosowski, Naik, and 
Teo, 2007; Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov, 2010) could explain why divorces are 
followed by poor returns. Similarly, even if marriages have no impact on fund performance, 
mean reversion could explain why marriages tend to lead inferior performance. Still, it is 
difficult to understand why returns persist during a divorce but mean revert during a marriage. 
Second, there could be a virtuous or vicious cycle between professional and personal life. 
For example, a slight marital tension leads to poor investment decisions, which lead to lower 
returns, which in turn increase marital stress, and so on. We cannot precisely isolate the personal 
and professional lives of hedge fund managers. While we couch our results in terms of the 
“effect” of marriage and divorce on performance, there is likely to be some element of feedback. 
We do, however, note that marriages and divorces are deeply personal events. More importantly, 
this endogeneity story cannot explain as well why performance wanes post marriage as it can 
explain why returns decline post divorce.  
Third, to the extent that participants in the marriage can forecast future returns and 
strategically time decisions to optimize over future projected returns, we may observe similar 
empirical outcomes to those documented, even if marriages and divorces have absolutely no 
effect on performance. For example, the spouse of a fund manager may foresee a rough patch 
one to two years ahead and may push for a divorce preemptively. While this story may explain 
our divorce findings, it cannot explain our marriage findings. A similarly strategic and prescient 
fiancé of a fund manager would certainly be reluctant to tie the knot immediately after having 
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been blessed with the foreknowledge that fund returns will hit a rough patch one to two years 
later.   
In a related story, hedge fund managers may be able to forecast changes in financial 
market conditions. For example, suppose a fund manager believes that market conditions are 
going to be tough for his strategy in the next one or two years. This causes him to feel depressed. 
As a result, he proposes to his significant other and marries so as to bring some compensatory 
joy into his life.24 This story, however, does not explain the divorce results as well as the 
marriage results. Managers who believe that future market conditions are going to be 
unconducive for their investment strategies are less likely to file for divorce since doing so will 
add undue stress onto themselves.    
The first two alternative explanations advanced above are based largely on the view that 
fund performance leads marriage and divorce. To investigate, we test the determinants of 
marriage and divorce by estimating the following multivariate logistic regressions on the 
probability of marriage and divorce: !"##$"%&!" = ∝ +!!!"#$!!"!!,!!!" + !!!"#$!"!!,!!!" + !!!"#$!!"!!",!!!"+ !!!"#$!"!!",!!!" + !!!"#$%%! + !!!"#$$""! + !!!"#!+ !!!"#$%&! + !!!"#"$%&"! + !!"!"#!"!! + !!!!"#"$%&'()!+ !!"log (!"#$%&'(!"!!)+ !!" 
																																								 																				
24 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this reverse causality story.  
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!"#$%&'!" = ∝ +!!!"#$!!"!!,!!!" + !!!"#$!"!!,!!!" + !!!"#$!!"!!",!!!"+ !!!"#$!"!!",!!!" + !!!"#$%%! + !!!"#$$""! + !!!"#!+ !!!"#$%!! + !!!"#"$%&"! + !!"!"#!"!! + !!!!"#"$%&'()!+ !!"log (!"#$%&'(!"!!)+ !!" 
where !"##$"%&!" is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when fund manager i 
marries in month m and takes a value of zero otherwise, !"#$%&'!" is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one when fund manager i divorces in month m and takes a value of zero 
otherwise, and the other variables are as previously defined. We also estimate analogous 
multivariate logistic regressions with RETURN in place of ALPHA to ensure that the risk-
adjustment methodology is not driving our results. The logistic regressions are estimated for all 
funds with return, flow, and fund characteristics information that are based in the 13 states for 
which we have marriage and divorce records (see Table 1). The regression sample therefore 
includes both event and non-event funds. This allows us to capture any cross-sectional variation 
in say, fund performance or flows, between event and non-event funds.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 The results reported in Table 9 broadly indicate that neither fund return nor fund alpha 
have a statistically reliable impact on the probability of marriage and divorce. The sign of the 
coefficient estimates on the RETURN and ALPHA variables suggest that, in line with our prior 
intuition, good fund performance leads marriage and poor fund performance leads divorce. 
However, all the coefficient estimates on RETURN and ALPHA are statistically indistinguishable 
at the ten percent level except for that on !"#$!!"!!",!!!"  in the marriage regression, 
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indicating that only fund alpha two years ago exerts a modestly significant impact on the 
probability of a marriage.25 Because fund performance closer to the event date has no reliable 
impact on the probability of marriage and divorce, this provides little support for the view that 
fund performance determines marriage and divorce. 
 These results are not surprising given the findings from the social psychology and labor 
economics literature. Jonason, Li, and Madson (2011) show that it is not so much the access to 
valuable resources per se that makes a mate desirable, rather it is the deeper and more 
meaningful underlying traits that allow one to earn those resources that matter for mate selection. 
Similarly, Charles and Stephen (2004) find that strictly speaking, it is not evidence about the 
economic well-being of a couple after an earnings shock that increases the probability of a 
divorce but rather new information that the earnings shock sends about the partner’s fitness as a 
mate (i.e., discipline and temperament) that impacts the divorce decision. Since such character 
traits matter for mate selection and divorce, and a short bout of good or poor investment 
performance is unlikely to signal changes in such underlying qualities, it is unsurprising that we 
do not find a statistically reliable relationship between past one- or two-year fund performance 
and the probability of marriage and divorce.  
 Nonetheless, these findings do not completely eliminate the possibility that endogeneity 
or feedback effects may be partially responsible for our results. For example, the divorce results 
may still be partially driven by the negative feedback loop between poor investment performance 
and marital distress or by perceptive spouses filing for divorce to preempt a bad patch of returns. 
The marriage results may be partially driven by fund managers trying to create joy in their lives 
																																								 																				
25	Interestingly, we find that a decrease in fund flows is associated with an increase in divorce rates two years later. 
One view is that marital problems leading to a divorce could have distracted fund managers and hampered capital 
raising efforts as early as two years prior to the event. 
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to compensate for poor investment performance in the face of tough financial market conditions. 
Taken as a whole, the results in this paper, especially the findings on fund manager bandwidth, 
trading behavior, disposition, and return implications around marital events, are more in keeping 
with the limited attention hypothesis.26 Still, we acknowledge the role that the afore-mentioned 
alternative explanations may play in driving at least some of our findings.  
4. Robustness tests 
4.1. Varying the event window 
In our baseline results, we employed an event period of six months (starting three months 
before and ending three months after the marital event). We also used a before period that starts 
two years prior to the event and ends three months before the event, as well as an after period 
that starts three months after the event and ends two years after the event. To gauge the 
sensitivity of our results to these specifications, we vary the length and composition of the 
overall event window. In the first alternative specification, we consider a longer 12-month event 
period and corresponding shorter 18-month before and after periods. In the second alternative 
specification, we keep the event period at six months but extend both the before and after periods 
to 33 months so that the before period starts three years prior to and ends three months before the 
event while the after period starts three months after and ends three years after the event. Finally, 
in the third alternative specification, we shorten the event period to one month. As with the 
baseline specification, the before period starts two years prior to the event and the after period 
ends two years post event. The results from the multivariate regression analysis with these 
																																								 																				
26 For example, it is not clear why managers whose spouses file preemptively for divorce will trade less actively 
during a divorce and be hurt by their style-, benchmark-, and factor-hugging activity. It is also not clear why 
managers who forecast a bad patch in performance and marry to derive some compensatory joy in their lives will 
succumb more to the disposition effect during a marriage and be hurt by their lack of trading discipline.  
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alternative event window specifications are reported in Panels A, B, and C of Table 10. They 
indicate that our baseline results are robust to changes in the length and composition of the 
overall event window.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
4.2. Manager manipulation of fund returns 
There are concerns that managers may be incentivized to manipulate fund returns around 
a marriage and a divorce. For instance, to minimize the assets that her spouse can legally lay a 
claim on, a fund manager going through a divorce may be incentivized to understate returns. 
Similarly, a fund manager who is getting married may be incentivized to overstate returns prior 
to the marriage. Bollen and Pool (2008, 2009) find evidence to suggest that hedge fund managers 
delay reporting losses to attract investors. However, it is not clear whether they also manipulate 
returns to minimize the proportion of wealth that their ex-spouses can lay claim on. It is also not 
clear how such return manipulation by the fund manager will materially affect our results, since 
we primarily find that fund performance deteriorates in the six-month period surrounding a 
marriage and a divorce. Moreover, the manipulation story predicts that fund performance 
improves post divorce, which squarely goes against our baseline findings in Table 4. 
Nonetheless, to address such concerns, we redo the multivariate regression analysis for 
the sample of fund returns derived from firm stock return holdings reported in the Thomson 
Financial 13-F holdings data. We argue that there is less scope for manipulation in the verifiable 
13-F filings data that are reported to the SEC. The results on the returns derived from stock 
holdings data are reported in Panel D of Table 10. The number of observations falls by about 44 
percent when we analyze the sample of fund returns derived from stock holdings data. 
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Nonetheless the coefficient estimates on fund returns and alpha in the event window indicate that 
manager manipulation of fund returns does not drive our results. Hedge funds continue to 
underperform in the six-month period surrounding a marital event, when we analyze the 
manipulation-free return sample. One caveat when we run the analysis on firm stock return 
holdings is that while the impact on fund performance extends to the post event window for 
marriage, it does not extend to the post event window for divorce.  
4.3. Additional risk factors 
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud the analyses. To cater for hedge fund 
exposure to option based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001), we augment the Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) model with out-of-the-money S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) model and re-estimate the alpha regressions in Table 4. The coefficient 
estimates on the EVENT and AFTER variables remain economically and statistically significant 
after the inclusion of these two additional risk factors. Our results are also robust to augmenting 
the Fung and Hsieh model with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor to account for 
hedge fund exposure to liquidity risk (Sadka, 2010; Teo, 2011; Aragon and Strahan, 2012) and 
with an emerging markets risk factor based on the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.27 These 
results are reported in Panels E and F of Table 10.  
 
																																								 																				
27 In unreported results, we split the states based on whether they adopted unilateral divorce laws. Unilateral divorce 
allows marriages to end where one person wants out of the marriage and the other person wants to remain married. 
Stevenson (2007) finds that the adoption of unilateral divorce laws reduces investment in all types of marriage-
specific capital considered except home ownership. Newlywed couples in states that allow for unilateral divorce are 
less likely to support a spouse through school, more likely to have a wife in the labor force, and less likely to have a 
child. We find that unilateral divorce neither ameliorates nor heightens the impact of marital transitions on 
investment performance.    
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4.4  Pre-fee returns 
To shed light on the debate on the value of active management in the hedge fund 
industry, it is also helpful if we also analyze fund pre-fee returns. To derive pre-fee returns, it is 
important to match each capital outflow to the relevant capital inflow when calculating the high 
water mark and the performance fee. In our pre-fee return calculation, we assume as per 
Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) that capital leaves the fund on a first-in, first-
out basis.  
Based on pre-fee returns, in the six-month period surrounding a divorce, hedge fund 
managers underperform by 3.76 percent per annum relative to the pre-divorce period. After 
adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the underperformance 
during the divorce increases to 7.72 percent per annum. The pre-fee return spread is statistically 
significant at the five percent level while the pre-fee alpha spread is statistically significant at the 
one percent level. Similarly, in the six-month period surrounding a marriage, hedge fund 
managers underperform by 2.41 percent per annum relative to the pre-marriage period. After 
adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the underperformance 
during the marriage increases to 4.49 percent per annum. The pre-fee return spread is statistically 
significant at the ten percent level while the pre-fee alpha spread is statistically significant at the 
one percent level. In addition, the baseline multivariate regression results with pre-fee returns 
reported in Panel G of Table 10 confirm that our findings are robust to the imputation of fund 
fees.  
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5. Conclusion 
Limited investor attention plays a central role in empirical and theoretical work in 
financial economics. It forms the basis for research on category learning, style investing, and co-
movement. It has been used to explain market reaction to and the timing of firm earnings 
announcements, investor stock purchase decisions, as well as the lead-lag pattern in stock returns 
between economically linked consumer and supplier firms. Yet evidence directly connecting 
limited investor attention to investment performance has remained elusive.  
Using a novel data set of hedge fund manager marriages and divorces, this paper exploits 
variation on fund manager inattentiveness induced by marital events to estimate the effect of 
limited attention on investment performance. We argue that marital events are deeply personal 
events that distract fund managers from their investment activities. To our knowledge, this is the 
first empirical study that analyzes the impact of personal events on investment performance. 
Our results empirically validate the Jones view that significant life events, such as 
divorce, are obstacles to success in the field of finance. We show that both marriage and divorce 
are associated with deteriorations in fund risk-adjusted performance. During the six-month 
period surrounding a marriage, fund alpha falls by 8.50 percent per annum. Similarly, during the 
six-month period around a divorce, fund alpha drops by 7.39 percent per annum. In line with the 
limited attention hypothesis, the impact of marriage and divorce is strongest for busy fund 
managers who manage multiple funds or who do not belong to a team.  
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How does limited investor inattention engender deteriorations in fund performance? We 
show that inattentive hedge fund managers make fewer active investment decisions. They are 
more likely to mimic the risk loadings of their investment style peers as well as load up more on 
S&P 500 index stocks. They also make poorer investment decisions and exercise less investment 
discipline. In particular, fund managers who are tying the knot or undergoing divorce tend to be 
susceptible to the disposition effect. They are more likely to hold on to their losses and realize 
their gains during that period.  
Our findings therefore provide a starting point for understanding the impact of limited 
attention on professional money managers. Moreover, the results in this paper nicely support the 
notion of managerial skill in the hedge fund industry. After all, if hedge fund managers lack 
investment management skills, it should not matter for fund performance if managers are 
distracted by marital events. 
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State Divorce rate
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Arizona 0 0.00 2 0.80 2 0.18 n/a
California 215 25.09 80 31.87 295 26.62 0.37
Colorado 38 4.43 0 0.00 38 3.43 0.00
Connecticut 216 25.20 41 16.33 257 23.19 0.19
Florida 144 16.80 68 27.09 212 19.13 0.47
Georgia 33 3.85 9 3.59 42 3.79 0.27
Kentucky 3 0.35 0 0.00 3 0.27 0.00
Nevada 10 1.17 2 0.80 12 1.08 0.20
North Carolina 22 2.57 9 3.59 31 2.80 0.41
Ohio 16 1.87 2 0.80 18 1.62 0.13
Pennsylvania 5 0.58 0 0.00 5 0.45 0.00
Texas 139 16.22 30 11.95 169 15.25 0.22
Virginia 16 1.87 8 3.19 24 2.17 0.50
Total 857 100 251 100 1,108 100 0.31
Distribution of marital events for hedge fund managers
Table 1
This table reports the distribution of marital events, i.e., marriages and divorces, by state. Divorce rate is the
ratio of the number of divorces to the number of marriages within each state. The sample period is from
January 1994 to December 2012.
Marriage Divorce Total
Variable No marriage (1) Single marriage (2) Single divorce (3) Multiple marriages (4) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4)
Number of funds 4,522 635 279 117
Percentage of funds 81.43 11.44 5.02 2.11
Management fee (%) 1.422 1.428 1.384 1.392 -0.006 0.038 0.029
Performance fee (%) 16.670 16.590 17.298 16.263 0.080 -0.628 0.407
High-water mark (dummy) 0.752 0.751 0.792 0.697 0.001 -0.040 0.055
Fraction of funds with lock-ups 0.352 0.443 0.470 0.402 -0.090** -0.117** -0.050
Lock-up period (days) 112.2 153.0 87.650 216.700 -40.8** 24.600 -104.5**
Redemption period (months) 2.359 2.552 2.336 2.082 -0.194 0.023 0.277
Leveraged (dummy) 0.601 0.606 0.667 0.778 -0.005 -0.066 -0.177**
Assets under management (US$m) 130.855 96.879 121.377 131.884 33.976 9.478 -1.028
Returns (%) 0.758 0.779 0.702 0.772 -0.021 0.056 -0.013
Alpha (%) 0.504 0.532 0.497 0.548 -0.027 0.007 -0.044
Flow (%) 1.785 2.492 1.620 1.355 -0.707** 0.165 0.430
Total risk (%) 3.705 3.689 3.454 3.395 0.016 0.251 0.310
Idiosyncratic risk (%) 2.487 2.460 2.218 2.204 0.027 0.269 0.283
Table 2
Summary statistics
This table reports hedge fund characteristics grouped by the marital status of the fund manager. No marriage funds are those whose managers have no
marital records within the 13 states for the sample period. Single marriage funds are those for whom we find only one marriage record for the fund
manager. Single divorce funds are those for whom we find one marriage record and one divorce record for the fund manager. Multiple marriages funds
are those for whom we find more than one marriage record and one divorce record for the fund manager. Management fee and performance fee are both
in percentage. High-water mark is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the hedge fund uses high-water mark and zero otherwise. Lock-up
period is in days, conditional on non-zero records. Redemption period is in months. Leveraged is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the
hedge fund uses leverage and zero otherwise. Alpha is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the
last 24 months. Total risk is the standard deviation of raw monthly returns, while idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the monthly residuals
from the seven-factor alpha regressions. Risk is estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Before Event After Event-Before After-Event After-Before
Panel A: Marriage
Return 0.984 0.723 0.979 -0.261 0.256 -0.005
Alpha 1.023 0.598 0.760 -0.425** 0.162 -0.263**
Flow 2.138 2.628 0.846 0.490 -1.782* -1.292*
Total risk 3.537 3.198 3.149 -0.339 -0.049 -0.388
Idiosyncratic risk 2.799 2.522 2.264 -0.277 -0.258 -0.535**
Panel B: Divorce
Return 0.878 0.517 0.803 -0.361 0.286 -0.075
Alpha 0.750 0.101 0.559 -0.649** 0.458** -0.191
Flow 0.670 1.205 0.792 0.535* -0.413* 0.122
Total risk 2.990 2.845 2.823 -0.145 -0.022 -0.167
Idiosyncratic risk 1.838 1.604 1.647 -0.234 0.043 -0.191
This table reports univariate analysis of hedge fund performance and risk around marital events. Fund
performance metrics analyzed include raw monthly returns and Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
monthly alphas where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. Flow is monthly fund net
inflow in percentage. Total risk is the standard deviation of raw returns while the idiosyncratic risk is the
residual from the factor regressions. Risk is estimated over each non-overlapping period: "before", "event",
and "after". The "event" period is the six-month period spanning three months before and three months
after the marriage/divorce event. The period "before" is the 21-month period before the event window and
the period "after" is the 21-month period after the event window. Panel A reports results for marriage, while
Panel B reports results for divorce. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Table 3
Univariate analysis of hedge fund manager marital events
Independent variables RETURN ALPHA RISK RETURN ALPHA RISK
EVENT -0.453* -0.608** 0.042 -0.072 -0.472* 0.016
(-2.11) (-3.02) (0.11) (-0.37) (-2.14) (0.05)
AFTER -0.218 -0.285* -0.155 0.076 -0.274* -0.231
(-1.43) (-2.14) (-0.58) (0.54) (-2.44) (-1.00)
MGTFEE -0.032 0.178* 1.191** -0.273* 0.120 0.364*
(-0.31) (2.06) (6.62) (-2.45) (1.33) (2.10)
PERFFEE 0.020 0.003 -0.010 0.002 0.008 0.046**
(1.77) (0.30) (-0.48) (0.30) (1.16) (3.54)
HWM 0.222 0.145 -0.725 -0.352* -0.073 -2.243**
(0.97) (0.70) (-1.92) (-1.99) (-0.51) (-7.90)
LOCKUP -0.030 -0.034 -0.764 -5.910*** -0.937 20.368**
(-0.13) (-0.17) (-1.83) (-3.56) (-0.69) (7.38)
LEVERAGE -0.271 -0.431** -0.360 -0.016 -0.058 1.295**
(-1.73) (-2.91) (-1.32) (-0.10) (-0.44) (4.99)
AGE -0.045* -0.073** -0.011 0.001 -0.042** 0.055*
(-2.21) (-3.51) (-0.28) (0.04) (-4.02) (2.42)
REDEMPTION -0.033 -0.039 -0.073 -0.006 0.010 -0.192**
(-1.08) (-1.46) (-1.34) (-0.20) (0.42) (-4.06)
log(FUNDSIZE) 0.046 0.131** -0.353** 0.007 0.000 -0.062
(1.03) (3.22) (-4.39) (0.21) (0.01) (-1.15)
R-squared 0.009 0.024 0.224 0.008 0.017 0.352
N 3,361 2,286 513 3,011 1,859 495
Table 4
Regressions on hedge fund performance and risk
Dependent variable
Marriage Divorce
This table reports multivariate regression analysis of fund performance and risk. Dependent variables are
RETURN, ALPHA, and RISK. ALPHA is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha for hedge
funds where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. RISK is standard deviation of monthly
hedge fund returns estimated over each non-overlapping period associated with EVENT, and AFTER. The
independent variables include three indicator variables which represent different periods. EVENT takes a
value of one during the six-month period spanning three months before and three months after the
marriage/divorce event. AFTER takes a value of one during the 21-month period after the event window.
The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE),
performance fee (PERFFEE), high water mark indicator (HWM), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP),
redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in years (AGE)
and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). In the risk regression, we estimate AGE and FUNDSIZE as the
average age and size of the fund, respectively, in each non-overlapping period. The t-statistics, derived from
standard errors clustered by fund, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2012. *Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
TREATMENT*BEFORE -1.233 -0.222 -0.014 -0.350
(-1.62) (-1.23) (-0.06) (-1.44)
TREATMENT*EVENT -1.397** -0.836* -0.789* -0.975*
(-2.81) (-2.40) (-2.01) (-2.32)
TREATMENT*AFTER -1.160** -0.327* -0.143 -0.648*
(-3.43) (-2.12) (-0.78) (-2.04)
EVENT -0.963 -1.120* -0.761 -0.055
(-1.85) (-3.35) (-1.96) (-0.17)
AFTER -1.062 -0.566** 0.048 -0.613**
(-1.82) (-3.74) (0.30) (-2.81)
MGTFEE 0.111 0.306** 0.210 0.059
(0.54) (6.49) (1.09) (0.39)
PERFFEE 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.017*
(0.60) (0.45) (1.27) (2.52)
HWM -0.019 0.226 -0.136 -0.133
(-0.05) (1.15) (-0.69) (-0.69)
LOCKUP 0.817 0.183 0.516 -0.315
(1.64) (0.92) (0.59) (-0.97)
LEVERAGE -0.020 -0.038 -0.034 -0.003
(-0.39) (-1.74) (-1.56) (-0.12)
AGE 0.166* 0.109** 0.104 -0.011
(2.35) (2.86) (1.46) (-0.12)
REDEMPTION -0.252 -0.160 0.304 0.115
(-1.32) (-1.28) (1.89) (0.71)
Log(FUNDSIZE) -0.045* -0.039** -0.008 -0.028*
(-2.50) (-3.02) (-0.44) (-2.31)
R-squared 0.021 0.040 0.016 0.038
N 5,052 3,600 5,413 3,171
Table 5
Regressions on fund performance and risk with matched sample
Dependent variable
Marriage Divorce
This table reports multivariate regression analysis of fund performance with a matched sample. Dependent
variables are raw monthly return (RETURN) and the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha
(ALPHA). The independent variables include interactions of the treatment dummy (TREATMENT) with
three indicator variables which represent different periods. EVENT takes a value of one during the six-
month period spanning three months before and three months after the marriage/divorce event. BEFORE
takes a value of one during the 21-month period before the event window. AFTER takes a value of one
during the 21-month period after the event window. TREATMENT takes a value of one if the fund
manager gets married or divorced in that month, and takes a value of zero if the fund is in the control
group. Each fund in the treatment group is matched with a fund in the control group. The matched fund is
chosen to minimize the absolute difference in performance during the "Before" period. The other
independent variables include EVENT and AFTER as well as fund characteristics such as management fee
(MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), high water mark indicator (HWM), lock-up period in years
(LOCKUP), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE), fund age in
years (AGE) and the log of fund size (Log(FUNDSIZE)). The t-statistics, derived from standard errors
clustered by fund, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables One fund Two or more funds Single manager Team managed
Panel A: Event = Marriage; Dependent variable = Return
EVENT -0.222 -0.814** -0.945** -0.227
(-0.62) (-4.58) (-5.41) (-0.91)
AFTER -0.517 -0.600** -0.584** -0.245
(1.55) (-6.10) (-4.26) (-1.41)
N 1,125 2,236 1,496 1,865
Panel B: Event = Marriage; Dependent variable = Alpha
EVENT -0.383 -1.278** -0.786** -0.307
(-1.54) (-4.36) (-3.31) (-1.09)
AFTER -0.159 -0.618** -0.553** -0.129
(-0.63) (-5.65) (-3.41) (-0.68)
N 841 1,445 1,131 1,155
Panel C: Event = Divorce; Dependent variable = Return
EVENT 0.303 -1.278** -0.940* -0.313
(-0.43) (-4.36) (-2.32) (-1.80)
AFTER 0.110 -0.61** -0.537** -0.153
(-0.38) (-5.65) (-3.23) (-1.22)
N 1,130 1,881 903 2,108
Panel D: Event = Divorce; Dependent variable = Alpha
EVENT 0.345 -0.907** -0.767** -0.237
(-0.81) (-4.47) (-3.02) (-0.72)
AFTER -0.418 -0.375** -0.341** -0.314
(-1.58) (-2.83) (-2.32) (-1.54)
N 847 1,012 893 966
Managers sorted by number of funds managed Funds sorted by number of managers
This table reports multivariate regression analysis of fund performance and risk. Dependent variables are raw monthly return and monthly
alpha. Alpha is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor alpha for hedge funds. The independent variables include three indicator variables which
represent different periods. EVENT takes a value of one during the six-month period spanning three months before and three months after the
marriage/divorce event. BEFORE (omitted) takes a value of one during the 21-month period before the event window. AFTER takes a value of
one during the 21-month period after the event window. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee,
performance fee, high water mark indicator, lock-up period, redemption period, leverage indicator, fund age and fund size. Coefficient
estimates on these control variables are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics, derived from standard errors clustered by fund, are in parentheses.
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 6
Regressions on performance for fund managers sorted by manager bandwidth
Variable Before Event After Event-Before After-Event After-Before
DEVIATESTYLE 19.541 14.827 13.896 -4.714** -0.931 -5.645**
NONSPRATIO 0.648 0.645 0.608 -0.003 -0.037* -0.040**
NRSQUARED 0.812 0.787 0.690 -0.030 -0.100** -0.120**
ACTIVESHARE 0.526 0.514 0.502 -0.012 -0.012 -0.024*
DEVIATESTYLE 16.194 12.753 10.064 -3.441** -2.689** -6.131**
NONSPRATIO 0.646 0.642 0.611 -0.004 -0.031 -0.035
NRSQUARED 0.704 0.643 0.602 -0.061* -0.041 -0.102**
ACTIVESHARE 0.548 0.527 0.527 -0.021** 0.000 -0.021**
DEVIATESTYLE 0.808 -4.668 -4.788 -5.476** -0.120 -5.596**
NONSPRATIO 0.000 -0.001 -0.024 -0.001 -0.023* -0.024*
NRSQUARED 0.047 -0.088 -0.145 -0.135** -0.057 -0.192**
ACTIVESHARE -0.001 -0.011 -0.024 -0.010 -0.013 -0.023*
DEVIATESTYLE 1.628 -4.965 -5.830 -6.593** -0.865 -7.458**
NONSPRATIO 0.000 0.003 -0.023 0.003 -0.026 -0.023
NRSQUARED 0.020 -0.026 -0.035 -0.046* -0.009 -0.055*
ACTIVESHARE 0.001 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015* 0.003 -0.012*
Panel C: Marriage (difference-in-differences with matched sample)
Panel D: Divorce (difference-in-differences with matched sample)
Panel A: Marriage
Panel B: Divorce
Table 7
Style, index, and factor exposure analysis
This table reports analysis of hedge fund style, index, and factor exposure around marital events. The
metrics analyzed include DEVIATESTYLE, NONSPRATIO, NRSQUARED, and ACTIVESHARE.
DEVIATESTYLE measures style exposure and is the sum of the absolute deviations in fund Fung and
Hsieh (2004) 7-factor betas relative to that of fund's investment style. NONSPRATIO is the ratio of the
number of non S&P 500 index stocks added to a fund's portfolio relative to the total number of new
positions in a quarter. NRSQUARED is one minus the R-squared from the regression of fund excess
returns on the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7 factors. ACTIVESHARE is Cremers and Petajisto (2006) Active
Share measured against the S&P 500. The event window is the six-month period spanning three months
before and three months after the marriage/divorce event. The "before" period is the period 21 months
before the event window and the "after" period is the period 21 months after the event window. Panels A
and C report results for marriage while Panels B and D report results for divorce. In Panels C and D we
conduct a difference-in-differences analysis after matching funds based on the relevant trading behavior
metric. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. *Significant at the 5% level;
**Significant at the 1% level.
Before Event After
Panel A: Marriage
PLR 0.474 0.452 0.432
PGR 0.443 0.511 0.437
PLR-PGR 0.031** -0.059** -0.005
standard error 0.006 0.008 0.005
t-statistic 5.053 -7.171 -1.051
Panel B: Divorce
PLR 0.315 0.370 0.379
PGR 0.338 0.415 0.425
PLR-PGR -0.023** -0.045** -0.046**
standard error 0.008 0.011 0.006
t-statistic -2.900 -4.094 -7.636
Table 8
The disposition effect around marital events
This table compares the aggregate Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) to the aggregate
Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR), where PGR is the number of realized gains divided
by the number of realized gains plus the number of paper (unrealized) gains, and PLR is
the number of realized losses divided by the number of realized losses plus the number of
paper (unrealized) losses. Realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses are
aggregated over time for each period (i.e., before, event, and after) and over all funds. The t-
statistics test the null hypothesis that the differences in proportions are equal to zero
assuming all realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses result from
independent decisions. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
RETURNt-1,t-12 0.915 -5.770
(0.07) (-0.73)
[0.02] [-0.09]
ALPHAt-1,t-12 13.021 -5.043
(1.15) (-0.41)
[0.18] [-0.08]
FLOWt-1,t-12 -0.245 -0.075 -0.131 0.205
(-0.50) (-0.11) (-0.30) (0.54)
[-0.08] [-0.02] [-0.04] [0.05]
RETURNt-13,t-24 2.376 -5.668
(0.30) (-0.60)
[0.04] [-0.09]
ALPHAt-13,t-24 13.982 1.926
(1.71) (0.15)
[0.19] [0.01]
FLOWt-13,t-24 -0.131 -0.412 -0.908** -1.251
(-0.44) (-0.73) (-2.63) (-1.88)
[-0.04] [-0.13] [-0.26] [-0.34]
MGTFEE 0.506** 0.740** -0.107 -0.083
(4.95) (7.17) (-0.60) (-0.32)
PERFFEE -0.045 -0.066 0.027 0.034
(-1.09) (-1.37) (0.47) (0.35)
HWM 0.781 1.222 0.069 0.173
(1.46) (1.57) (0.12) (0.23)
LOCKUP 0.031 0.322 -2.279 -1.863
(0.08) (0.60) (-1.53) (-1.89)
LEVERAGE -0.017 -0.295 -0.007 -0.146
(-0.05) (-1.22) (-0.02) (-0.34)
REDEMPTION 0.009 -0.015 0.069 0.072
(0.09) (-0.14) (1.45) (1.45)
log(FUNDSIZE) -0.032 -0.019 -0.051 -0.023
(-0.42) (-0.17) (-0.79) (-0.25)
R-squared 0.0155 0.0371 0.0149 0.0154
N 157,820 105,943 157,820 105,943
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions that analyze the determinants of marriage
and divorce. Dependent variables are dummy variables which take a value of one if the fund manager
marries or divorces in month t. Columns (1) and (2) present results for the marriage regressions while
columns (3) and (4) present results for the divorce regressions. Explanatory variables include fund level
performance, flows, and characteristics. RETURNt-1,t-12, ALPHAt-1,t-12, and FLOWt-1,t-12 are average monthly
performance and flows one year before the marriage/divorce event. RETURNt-13,t-24, ALPHAt-13,t-24, and
FLOWt-13,t-24 are average monthly performance and flows two years before the marriage/divorce month.
ALPHA is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor alpha. The other independent variables include fund
characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), high-water mark indicator
(HWM), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION), leverage
indicator (LEVERAGE) and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE)). The t-statistics, derived from standard
errors clustered by fund, are in parentheses. Marginal effects, that reveal the impact of a one standard
deviation change in the independent variable on the probability of a marriage/divorce are in brackets. The
sample period is from January 1994 to December 2012. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the
1% level.
Table 9
Regressions on the probability of marriage and divorce amongst hedge fund managers
MARRIAGE DIVORCE
Dependent variable
Independent variables Return Alpha Return Alpha
Panel A: Event period = 12 months; Before period = 1 year 6 mths; After period = 1 year 6 mths
EVENT -0.574** -0.490** -0.323* -0.295
(-3.58) (-3.35) (-2.42) (-1.95)
AFTER -0.200 -0.487** -0.238 -0.455**
(-1.38) (-3.98) (-1.90) (-4.35)
Panel B: Event period = 6 mths; Before period = 2 years 9 mths; After period = 2 years 9 mths
EVENT -0.527** -0.622** -0.349 -0.493*
(-2.71) (-3.37) (-1.90) (-2.43)
AFTER -0.509** -0.417** -0.166 -0.285**
(-4.13) (-3.87) (-1.41) (-3.20)
EVENT -0.722* -0.568 -0.331 -0.320
(-2.32) (-1.91) (-1.12) (-0.97)
AFTER -0.469** -0.393** -0.524** -0.534**
(-3.41) (-3.21) (-4.08) (-5.25)
Panel D: Fund returns derived from 13F quarterly stock holdings
EVENT -0.125** -0.045** 0.002 -0.242**
(-6.61) (-2.64) (0.12) (-3.29)
AFTER -0.062** -0.050** 0.004 0.074
(-4.68) (-3.95) (0.32) (1.38)
Panel E: FH 7-factor model augmented with the Agarwal and Naik (2004) OTM option-based factors
EVENT -0.453* -0.714* -0.072 -0.957**
(-2.11) (-2.43) (-0.37) (-3.46)
AFTER -0.218 -0.776** 0.076 -0.537**
(-1.43) (-4.10) (0.54) (-2.86)
EVENT -0.453* -0.664* -0.072 -0.747**
(-2.11) (-2.37) (-0.37) (-3.48)
AFTER -0.218 -0.747** 0.076 -0.301*
(-1.43) (-4.06) (0.54) (-2.12)
Panel G: Pre-fee returns
EVENT -0.415 -0.553** -0.051 -0.598**
(-1.92) (-2.91) (-0.26) (-4.02)
AFTER -0.248 -0.278* 0.134 -0.222*
(-1.62) (-2.22) (0.94) (-2.19)
Panel F: FH 7-factor model augmented with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor and
the MSCI emerging markets factor
Panel C: Event period = 1 mth; Before period = 1 year 11 mths; After period = 1 year 11 mths
Table 10
Robustness tests
This table reports multivariate regression analysis of fund performance. Dependent variables are raw
monthly fund return and the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly fund alpha. The
independent variables include three indicator variables which represent different periods. Unless
otherwise stated, the variable EVENT takes a value of one during the six-month period spanning
three months before and three months after the marriage/divorce event. BEFORE (omitted) takes a
value of one during the 21-month period before the event window. AFTER takes a value of one
during the 21-month period after the event window. The other independent variables include fund
characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, high water mark indicator, lock-up period,
redemption period, leverage indicator, fund age and fund size. The t-statistics, derived from standard
errors clustered by fund, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2012. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
Marriage Divorce
